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This following essay uses Bryan W. Van Norden’s Taking Back Philosophy: A Multicultural 
Manifesto (2017) to articulate several reasons for why diversification efforts in professional 
philosophy face an uphill battle. Besides methodological, material, and “ideological” obstacles, 
diversity initiatives in academic philosophy are often commandeered and result in tokenization rather 
than diversification. On top of that, many professional philosophers view calls for diversification as 
an additional burden levied upon philosophy departments, one that comes not from genuine 
philosophical interests but from a cultural atmosphere that is increasingly under the influence of 
political correctness and identity politics. As such, diversification is antithetical to the furtherance of 
“real philosophy” and often amounts to a waste of time and money. Methodologically, or so the 
thought goes, one cannot find a discipline that is more disserved by administrative efforts, or the 
vociferous complaints of members of philosophy departments, to “diversify.” 
Some of these claims manifest in Van Norden’s book, and as nonwhite Mexican-American in 
professional philosophy, I must admit that I am happy to see more “mainstream” (read “white”) 
philosophers willing to engage in this type of metaphilosophical debate. That being said, whereas 
Taking Back Philosophy poses a series of internal challenges to professional philosophy, it pales in 
comparison to the critical work on the diversification of philosophy done from the margins of 
academic philosophy, from the decolonial, Latin American, indigenous, feminist, and Africana 
thought of the past three decades. These traditions are not only “diverse,” but they also problematize 
and critically challenge the professionalized practice of philosophy today. I therefore find it 
frustrating (but am not surprised) that Van Norden’s book garners professional uptake whereas the 
work of nonwhites, women, and philosophers from the “formerly” colonial world remain relatively 
ignored. This book’s success, in this sense, is also its failure.  
You might be thinking that this line of thought is slightly unfair given that Van Norden’s 
comparative endeavors are primarily between Eastern and Western perspectives (as he admits 
throughout the book). To hold him accountable for not working in the aforementioned traditions is 
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off the mark. Therein lies the problem. It is unfortunate, bear with me, that Van Norden specializes 
in Chinese philosophy and strives to work from those traditions he is most familiar with. 
“Unfortunate” because this will reinforce the idea that Taking Back Philosophy is essentially about 
the need for more Chinese philosophy (or, generally speaking, “Asian” philosophy) in our profession. 
While of course valuable to the profession, “Asian philosophy” is the most tolerable form of 
“diversity” in professional philosophy today; it is many a philosopher’s go-to interpretation of “non-
Western” or “comparative philosophy.” In saying this, I do not mean to disregard the philosophical 
systems and longstanding traditions/debates that fall under the umbrella of “Asian philosophy,” but I 
am frequently shocked by how this area of specialization is fetishized and used for ideological 
purposes by professional philosophers, as I explain below. 
I can put this concern in the form of a question. Van Norden’s book is clever enough to succeed 
in making some philosophers uncomfortable to the point that they take the plunge into what passes 
for “comparative philosophy” in the profession these days. Would Van Norden’s book be as effective 
if its main point of comparison was the experience of people of color in the United States, Nahuatl 
thought (the philosophy of the “Aztec” people), or even feminist philosophy, rather than Chinese 
philosophy? Would Van Norden’s argument, particularly constructed with Chinese philosophy in 
mind, work for Latin American philosophy? While Van Norden calls for a truly global and not 
globalized conception of philosophy, to borrow language from David Hall,1 it is a call that, 
unfortunately, will fall upon orientalist ears. (Just to be clear, I mean Edward Said’s use of 
“orientalism.”) 
Unless Van Norden’s claims are taken farther, they might not help achieve the goals his book sets 
out to accomplish. Moreover, in terms of the text itself, there is an unspoken tension between the call 
for diversification and his attempt to demonstrate the value of philosophical inquiry in the 
sociopolitical and historical contexts of today (the social contexts that led to Trump!). This is a tension 
that many will exploit in order to evade diversification efforts, a point I return to in my closing. 
Overall, while the book is a start (albeit a late one) to the debate about the value of “philosophy” in a 
rapidly changing world, Taking Back Philosophy fails address the deeper reasons for why 
diversification efforts are stymied. It also fails to adequately address the complexity of the issues 
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Diversity and Philosophy: On Suicidal Tendencies 
Taking Back Philosophy problematizes the supposed (and self-assumed) universality of Anglo-
European philosophy (chapter 1). It provides an excellent example of what comparative philosophy 
ought to look like (chapters 2), and points out the racism, xenophobia, blatant ethnocentrism, and fear 
operative in academia today (chapter 3). It also helps to explain the anti-intellectualism of our present 
cultural and political climate (chapter 4) and aspires to restore a sense of philosophy as vocation 
(chapter 5). Succinctly put (at least when it comes to chapters devoted to the diversification of 
professional philosophy), Van Norden’s central claim is that “[p]hilosophy must diversify or die.”2 
Throughout my relatively short tenure in academic philosophy, I have relied upon this slogan time 
and time again with mixed results. I am sad to say, however, that if faced with the option between 
diversification and departmental “death,” the latter is what many, if not most, tenured philosophers 
would prefer.3 Indeed, if my experiences in professional philosophy have taught me anything, it is 
that many, especially those who are resistant to change, would rather see the ship sink, so to speak, 
than keep it afloat with women, racialized minorities, members of LGTBQ communities, and/or non-
Western philosophical interests at the helm: “It just would not be philosophy anymore!” (Of course, 
this is not true of all departments or tenured professors of philosophy, but a lot—I would wager a 
majority.) 
The reasons for such a stark claim are manifold. Probably the most important stems from a 
collective conflict of interests shared by many professional philosophers. A majority of persons 
occupying tenure-stream positions in departments and universities throughout the globe—especially 
in English-speaking countries and former colonial metropoles—have professional, economic, and 
personal investments in the philosophical status quo (in which diversity is minimally important). They 
are disincentivized when it comes to diversity since, in the eyes of many professional philosophers, 
it would entail the loss of tradition and “prestige,” the abandonment of rigor (or so it is assumed), and 
the dissolution of the aura of sophistication and deference that is often evoked upon mentioning to 
someone that one is a professor of philosophy (or some other vain reason). Absent these, or so the 
idea goes, much of the money allocated to departmental budgets, faculty lines, salaries, and 
competitive research grants would be lost (since who would ever find philosophy attractive or take it 
seriously in its new multicultural garb?). Diversification efforts are seen as a direct attack on 
philosophical specialization, even though one can argue it will lead to new specialties and the 
broadening of philosophy on the whole (these efforts might even attract new crops of undergraduates 
into the discipline who might then find more “mainstream” areas interesting). On top of all this, 
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subjective preferences and biases, and indeed racism, sexism, and other forms of prejudice disallow 
“diversity” efforts to be full realized; they are often commandeered or result in tokenized hiring. 
Revealing a nefarious conflation of self and community, many philosophers are threatened by change, 
such that if one’s department or the field as a whole rapidly transforms then their individual status as 
a “philosopher” is called into question. In order for one to thrive as the philosopher she or he is today, 
professional philosophy has to remain the same (if not even be made great again!).4 
For these reasons (and others), nothing short of generational turn-over, via retirement or other 
means, will allow for the widespread adoption of what Van Norden writes of: the replacement of one 
species of philosopher with another altogether,5 or, at the very least, a new crop of philosophers less 
invested in the way things are. Diversification efforts require the full support of administrators, 
including deans and provosts. They often have to force change. Perhaps flying the face of Van 
Norden’s attempt, you will not convince many philosophers to do right in terms of the inclusion of 
racialized minorities, women, and LGBTQ communities—a telling and sad point that echoes the anti-
intellectualism he describes. Arguments pertaining to the well-being of philosophy departments or 
the need for attracting majors will rarely work (again, sink the ship!). Neither will clever gambits that 
ask philosophers to own up about the fact that they speak on behalf of only a portion of humanity and 
not all of it, as Van Norden and Jay Garfield dared to suggest in their New York Times op-ed. For 
diversification to be successful, you need as much faculty support as possible, financial investment 
and commitment from colleges and administrations, and the blatant disregard of racist, sexist, and 
homophobic perspectives (there should not be any reasoning with the unreasonable—I have seen 
department chairs commit this folly only to reveal their own conservative preferences in the process). 
You cannot learn from or find value in another individual when you do not view them or their identity 
as a valid locus for knowledge-production. To make matters worse, forcing one to think in your terms 
typically results in their work being derivative not to mention inauthentic. 
 
Methodological Blinders and the White Light 
Attempts at “diversifying” professional academic philosophy take many shapes and forms. Some of 
these attempts seek to increase the number of people of color and/or women in the field but keep in 
place the current research interests, the types of courses offered by philosophy departments, and the 
range of experience or sources for knowledge considered pertinent to philosophical inquiry. Other 
attempts at diversification paint a more global picture of philosophy and strive to expand the variety 
or range of questions considered “philosophical” but are not necessarily concerned with changing the 
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face of philosophy. The best forms of philosophical diversification do both, that is, they increase the 
number of people of color and women in professional philosophy as well as incorporate more 
“projects of color” (see below) into the mainstream. They also do not demand the complete overlap 
of the two—that is to say, they do not leave it up to the minorities and women to do all the work. That 
being said, increasing the number of white people (men in particular) studying “non-Western” 
philosophy does not diversify philosophy; neither does offering admission into “club philosophy” to 
racialized minorities, women, and those from the “formerly” colonized world albeit on terms 
requiring their assimilation into well-established philosophical questions, methods, and problematics. 
Philosophical diversity requires a change in personnel as well as thematic adjustment, the type of 
which the pervasive whiteness of professional philosophy will not allow for.  
In “Philosophy Raced. Philosophy Erased,” Charles Mills explains that philosophers of color face 
an assortment of challenges upon entering the ranks of professional philosophy.6 Some of these 
include implicit and explicit racial/gender biases, microaggressions, double standards, forms of 
tokenization, and outright hostility or animosity. All of these, unfortunately, have come to be expected 
by racialized minorities entering academic philosophy (which does not make them right). The most 
perplexing and unique challenge faced by philosophers of color, Mills continues, is the relegation of 
the types of interpersonal, structural, and historical issues faced by racialized minorities to the status 
of “non-philosophy.” In particular, Mills has in mind questions on race and processes of racialization, 
but one can easily add racism, sexism, colonization, slavery, various forms of objectification and 
denigration, political marginalization, economic exploitation (as women and/or people of color), and 
more, all of which I referred to as “projects of color” above. 
The relegation of projects of color to the status of non-philosophy comes from certain 
metaphilosophical commitments and specific ideals about the end goal of philosophical thought. In 
comparison to other fields, such as literature, sociology, or history, philosophy aspires to ask perennial 
questions, those that span space and time and place one on a discursive level where they can think 
alongside of the great minds of history. “Philosophy is supposed to be abstracting away from the 
contingent, the corporeal, the temporal, the material, to get at necessary, spiritual, eternal, ideal 
truths,” writes Mills.7 From this perspective, the range of questions that fall into the domain of 
philosophy ought not include those that lack broad appeal. Questions devoted to race and processes 
of racialization, therefore, are of limited relevance to “philosophers” on account of being “local,” 
particular, too corporeal (as it were), and mostly of interest to “minorities.” It is not that white 
philosophers altogether lack interest in any of the above concerns; many do work on and find such 
Professional Philosophy, “Diversity,” and Racist Exclusion 44 
 
   
topics interesting (such that my use of “projects of color” might even be offensive to some). 
Nevertheless, Mills’ analysis centers on the way questions connected to race are considered (at best) 
“applied” issues, “special topics,” the ever so charitable “non-ideal theory,” or whatever term is used 
to confer peripheral, tangential, outlier-status as not really philosophy.  
A major reason (but definitely not the only one) for this type of marginalization is the fact that the 
hegemonic group of individuals traditionally associated with being “philosophers” lack the range of 
perspective or experiences often shared by people of color. To make matters worse, this group also 
inhabits positions of racialized normativity. Using political philosophy as an example, Mills explains 
that the experiential starting point for people of color, generally speaking, runs contrary to the basic 
assumptions about political subjectivity maintained by “mainstream” thinkers. He writes, “Your 
moral equality and personhood are certainly not recognized; you are not equal before the law; and the 
state is not seeking to protect but to encroach upon your interests in the interests of the white 
population.”8 In the contexts of the United States racial imaginary, African Americans are 
fundamentally viewed as criminal and dangerous; the existence of Latinx peoples is predicated on 
tropes of “illegality.” While the rights of Blacks and Hispanics might be protected nominally, these 
protections are not automatically granted in our society but must be continuously fought for and 
asserted, a point that gives new meaning to the idea of racial privilege. All this is to say, a 
metaphysically stable and legally secure political subjectivity is something political philosophers can 
take for granted only when the class of individuals who make up professional philosophy are treated 
the same by the law, show up in similar ways in terms of political representation, and also share a 
similar range of normative concerns. Thus, when relying upon one’s (white racial) self as a frame of 
reference for discussion of rights or political organization (or even when designing syllabi!), it is quite 
possible that, in academic contexts where a majority of peers inhabit more or less the same circle of 
privilege as you, the particularity of your view is obscured and the experience of “unraced” whites 
becomes the norm, as Mills puts it. 
I offer the question of political justice as it relates to undocumented immigrants or irregular 
migration as a classic example. At the onset of A Theory of Justice, John Rawls explains that his main 
object of inquiry is justice, the basic structure of society.9 Seeking a simple conception of justice, 
Rawls limits his project in two ways (one of which is important here): “I shall be satisfied if it is 
possible to formulate a reasonable conception of justice for the basic structure of society conceived 
for the time being as a closed system isolated from other societies”.10 In The Law of Peoples, he adds 
“this position views society as closed: persons enter only by birth, and exit only by death.”11 In 
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Political Liberalism (1996), Rawls continues: “That a society is closed is a considerable abstraction, 
justified only because it enables us to speak about certain main questions free from distracting 
details.”12 Besides reducing the plight of undocumented peoples to a “distracting detail,” Rawls’ 
restriction betrays his own principles by providing too much information regarding the persons behind 
the famed “veil of ignorance.” When formulating the basic principles upon which the structure of 
society will depend, we may not know if we are rich, poor, black, white, able-bodied or not, male or 
female, gay or straight, but we do know that everyone behind the veil will be a “citizen” or, at the 
very least, have regular status. Through this restriction Rawls limits justice, in its most basic form, to 
those who are formal members of the body politic, a move that in the context of the United States 
alienates upwards of twelve million undocumented people from the basic structure of society (i.e., 
justice). Unless such a limitation is justifiable, which is to say that the burden is upon Rawlsians to 
show how citizenship is not an arbitrary starting point for a theory of justice (again, appealing to 
Rawls’ own standards), how can the range of justice, in its most basic form, be so narrow? 
In asking the above, my goal is not to engage the burgeoning literature on the ethics of 
immigration. Instead, building upon what Mills writes, I demonstrate how many of the assumptions 
that “mainstream” philosophy rest upon, like taking citizenship or more abstractly “membership” for 
granted when constructing a theory of justice, reflects a rather particular perspective committed to a 
specific set of normative concerns. Now, imagine this happening in the aggregate, adding things like 
prestige and pedigree, canon formation, the weight of tradition, and the “need for rigor” into the mix.13 
One can easily see how many of those intellectual endeavors that might attract and welcome more 
nonwhite people into the philosophy are jettisoned (I am tempted to say “deported”) to ethnic studies, 
area studies, women and gender studies, etc. 
Before moving on, it is important to underscore that philosophers of color are not only interested 
in so-called projects of color. Neither is it the case that all minorities in philosophy think in 
essentialized ways that correspond with race, gender, or sexuality. To make such an assumption would 
be as oppressive and totalizing as the other injustices nonwhite philosophers put up with. 
Nevertheless, my concern is with those individuals who would argue that race has nothing to do with 
philosophy; with those who dismiss the epistemic salience of social identity in philosophy altogether. 
Moreover, it is not merely the numerical overrepresentation of whites that leads to the alienation of 
minorities in philosophy. Mills’ ultimate concern is with gate-keeping methodological constraints and 
“border-building” tactics that simultaneously curtail the diversification of philosophy as well as the 
obscure the particularity of those concerns passing themselves off as “universal.” Through this 
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process, professional philosophy remains overpopulated by white people (men in particular) and 
dominated by white interests passing themselves off as race-less philosophical concerns.  
For additional support take Plato’s Republic. On my read, this book is essentially about justice as 
it unfolds at both the political and individual levels, and the justification for why reason ought to 
govern nonreason. For Plato, justice amounts to a kind of harmony or balance. A properly aligned or 
“balanced” psyche means that one’s reason dominates their more beastly parts, i.e., their 
passions/spirits and physical needs. Similarly, a just society requires an organic social totality wherein 
the rational parts of the body-politic command the non-rational. Plato’s right, in my opinion, to think 
that what you put into a society you get out at the individual level: if society is just, the people in it 
will be just. I believe the inverse is also true. If your society is predicated on injustice, the people 
within it will be incapable of a “balanced soul.” In this sense, think of W.E.B. Du Bois’ idea of double-
consciousness. An African-American man who lived during that time in American history when black 
people were emancipated but nevertheless unfree (1868–1963), Du Bois describes the feeling of 
having a split or fractured self in his seminal work The Souls of Black Folk. He writes, “It is a peculiar 
sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one’s self through the eyes of 
others, of measuring one’s soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. 
One ever feels his two-ness,—an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, two unreconciled 
strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength alone keeps it from being torn 
asunder.”14 Du Bois has his self-consciousness, his “self,” but when introspecting he’s also forced to 
factor in the opinion of others, namely whites. While some might think that this is something all 
people do, that is, we all have to factor the opinion of others into our identity-construction, not all do 
it equally. Imagine being black and having to filter all of one’s exchanges with whites knowing that 
they view you first and foremost as threatening, criminal, or rapacious. From this perspective, of what 
value is a balanced soul when suffering from double-consciousness? Can Du Bois achieve harmony 
of the soul without one part of his “self” dominating the other? In a racialized context burdened by 
white supremacy, allowing “reason” to command “nonreason” means something quite different than 
what Plato had in mind. 
Following Mills, my point is to demonstrate how the experiential starting-point for much of 
philosophy is white normativity. Those inhabiting white normativity are privileged to only have to 
deal with problems of the mind and not those problems generated by the racist minds in their midst. 
And even though a case can be made that white people too are incapable of achieving a balanced soul 
in a society predicated on white supremacy, they are capable of evading this question in most 
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philosophy courses. The sense of whiteness that permeates profesional philosophy is a byproduct of 
methodological assumptions that run deeper than simply suggesting that if philosophy departments 
do not diversify, then they should own up to their ethnocentrism. Garfield captures what I mean when 
he writes that “ignoring non-Western philosophy in our research, curriculum, and hiring decisions is 
deeply racist, and is a practice we cannot endorse in good faith once we recognize this.” (Too bad he 
walks this claim back).15 
 
The Semiotics of “Diversity”: On Philosophical Orientalism 
While it is one thing to “diversify” philosophy, it is quite another to empower “epistemes” of 
difference. Van Norden’s argument for why Chinese philosophy deserves greater coverage in U.S. 
universities needs to be considered in light of this claim. He offers a valid argument that hinges on 
China’s increasing relevance on a global scale, the richness of this tradition, and the overwhelming 
whiteness of philosophy in English-speaking contexts.15 In addition to the question I asked above, 
that is, would this argument work if we swapped “Chinese philosophy” for Latin American or 
Africana thought, let me pose another. Does Chinese philosophy deserve more uptake in the United 
States than, say, Africana or Latin American or Asian American philosophies? Given that “students 
of color are confronted with a curriculum that is almost monolithically white,”16 as Van Norden 
writes, why not ask these students to study philosophical traditions that serve them or their interests 
better, and not just assume that their professor’s appreciation of “Asian thought” will suffice in terms 
of exposing students to difference? Why not draw from, and philosophically empower in the going, 
the range of experience of these students of color?  
A response might be that by introducing students to a “non-Western” perspective, like Chinese 
philosophy, one exposes them ways of thinking that go beyond their sociohistorical contexts and thus 
do them some good: the broadening of epistemic horizons. While I agree with this, my rejoinder is 
the following: First, are we really doing students of color (particularly Black, Latinx, and indigenous 
students) a service by having them study a perspective that is, to some extent, completely irrelevant 
to their point of view? Again, I do not mean this as a knock against Chinese philosophy. Nevertheless, 
given the current racial, gender, and ethnic demographics of professional philosophy, most students 
of color already occupy a position of marginality or “otherness” relative to professional philosophy. 
By studying Anglo-Continental philosophical traditions these students are, in a sense, being exposed 
to a different tradition. They are already becoming “worldly” (and, in fact, due to their lack of 
privilege are forced to). My assumption here is that growing up nonwhite in a white dominated social 
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context(s) grants one a type of double-consciousness or mestiza/o or “border” consciousness that 
Gloria Anzaldúa writes of.17 Regardless, if the exposure to epistemic difference or getting outside of 
one’s comfort zone is not working for these students now, i.e., when nonwhite students study “white 
philosophers,” why assume that asking these students to think about Chinese thought will be better? 
It might do white students some good, but does it help nonwhite students? 
Second, a central premise of much comparative philosophy (especially the East-meets-West 
variety) is the notion that comparative philosophy gets one into the mind of an “Other.” I think this 
assumes a type of mastery over others that is quite oppressive. Instead of assuming we now understand 
the world from a different point of view, why not decenter the self in a way that allows for a world of 
others to be possible? This should be the main goal of comparative philosophy. However, as it is 
currently taught, admittedly not by people as prepared as Van Norden (and I say this because of his 
second chapter is a great example of what comparative philosophy ought to look like), “getting into 
the minds of the other” is how many philosophers (and administrators) think of comparative or “non-
Western” philosophy.  
When comparing ideas across cultures, especially when one attempts to transverse time as well as 
space, as one does when studying Nahuatl (“Aztec”) philosophy for instance, a cautious and self-
reflexive approach is best. Rather than perpetuate debates as to whether or not one is accurately 
portraying the thought practices and philosophical systems of conquered or foreign peoples, or for 
that matter debates about whether or not one can transcend their own epistemic framework and avoid 
the charge of cultural chauvinism or the problem of incommensurability, comparative philosophical 
practices are better appreciated for their reflexive capabilities. In light of a lingering skepticism 
about whether or not transcultural meanings exist, comparative philosophers are better off gaining a 
sense for how the comparative process challenges one’s preconceived views for what constitutes 
philosophy in the first place. In short, comparative philosophy ought to assist more in decentering or 
destabilizing the self rather than understanding “the Other,” as counterintuitive as this might seem. 
While I do not mean to obviate the importance of or dismiss the possibility of cross-cultural 
communication, one jeopardizes the significance of this methodological approach if one seeks to get 
inside the mind of other people. 
Returning to my point, while Van Norden’s argument is complex and multifaceted, most of those 
who read it will only see or hear the need to study “Oriental” philosophy. The book will garner a half-
hearted read, one that works in ideological ways to reify professional philosophy’s self-conception as 
well as several of its vices when it comes to comparative work. That is to say, given that Van Norden 
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personally works in Eastern traditions, his examples and demonstration for how to do comparative 
philosophy will eclipse his larger message.  
When professional philosophers see “non-Western” philosophy, most think about Buddhism, 
Confucianism, or Daoism and seem to only have the so-called Far East in mind, never mind the Indian 
Subcontinent or Southeast Asia. Not only does such an image of “non-Western” philosophy lead to 
the exclusion of Amerindian, Africana, Latin American, and Caribbean traditions, since many of these 
have one foot in the West (which thus analytically rules them out as “non-Western”), but it also 
reinforces an image of historical progress articulated by G. W. F. Hegel who was famous for thinking 
that world history travels from “East” to “West.” When Anglo-European philosophers study Eastern 
traditions they often understand themselves as glimpsing images of philosophy’s past. Or, seeking to 
rebel from the Judeo-Christian underpinnings of Occidental culture (but nonetheless fans of 
“spirituality”), many professional philosophers are attracted to the religiously diverse aspects of 
Eastern thought (believe it or not, I have seen petty academics purport to be “Buddhist” only to 
frustrate those who claim to be Catholic). All this is to say, when looking “East,” Western 
philosophers catch a glimpse of their pre-approved past (assuming one does not venture too far east!). 
Most of what they see challenges Western thought in ways permitted by Western thinkers: the move 
from orthodoxy to orthopraxy; from essentialist, substantialist or static metaphysics to process 
ontologies; from philosophy as love of wisdom to contemplative and esoteric understandings of 
“philosophy”; and more. All of these take place within a range of intellectual developments that, 
although different enough to make possible points of differentiation, there remains enough overlap 
such that comparisons can be made.  
When confronted with “radical difference,” the type of difference that runs counter to the narrative 
of historical development, one can start to view the dangers and risks involved in comparative 
endeavors. If Western philosophers were to take Africana, Native American, Latin American, and 
Caribbean traditions seriously, especially in terms of analyzing their philosophical perspective and 
values, one would be making quite the political statement: it is to say, contrary to some of the most 
hallowed voices of the Western philosophical canon, that Africa is not a continent devoid of reason; 
that mestiza ways of knowing constitute real philosophy; that Nahuatl-speaking peoples, amidst the 
fact that some might have engaged in human sacrifice, were capable of practicing formal 
philosophical investigation. Such a statement would undermine the sense of historical progress that 
undergirds Western philosophy. The Native American philosopher Vine Deloria Jr. puts it the 
following way,  




Tribal people have traditionally been understood by Westerners as the last remnants 
of a hypothetical earlier stage of cultural evolution, and this so-called “primitive stage” 
of human development is a necessary preamble to any discussion of human beings and 
the meaning of their lives. Indeed, the stereotype of primitive peoples anchors the 
whole edifice of Western social thought. We need the primitive so that we can 
distinguish Western civilization from it and congratulate ourselves on the progress we 
have made.18  
 
Deloria notes the difficulties he and others face when trying to explain how it is possible that 
indigenous peoples practiced “philosophy.” Recognizing the reasoning skills of indigenous peoples 
necessarily undermines the narrative of “progress,” “civility,” and “sophistication” that undergirds 
Western modernity, an idea reliant upon relations of domination, processes of racialization and 
enslavement, as well as the de-historization of indigenous peoples and their subsumption into 
“universal” (read European) history. All of these (and more) were the means through which the 
reasoning faculties of non-Western cultures were covered-over and reduced to a caricature, one that, 
as Deloria notes at the end of the above passage, bolsters the superiority of the Western modern 
subject.  
 
Towards a Liberating Philosophy 
For me, when one speaks of diversity, the state of professional philosophy is not only at stake. I see 
the debates about the nature of philosophical diversity as part of attempts at epistemic justice in light 
of European colonization and the ways in knowledge is racialized, gendered, and politicized today. 
Influenced by liberation philosophy (broadly construed), I believe that philosophy is not an end in 
itself but part of the struggle against multiple forms of dehumanization and oppression. This is why, 
historically, some of the best works in philosophy (cross-culturally speaking) are dialogues where 
neither of the interlocutors are reducible to the other but represent differing points of view. Here, 
taking philosophical diversity seriously, empowering and acknowledging the possibility that from 
where you think and who you are matters to philosophy, can lead to the “liberation” of philosophy.  
Van Norden believes in such an ideal, too. Seemingly taking a page out of liberatory philosophy, 
the last chapters of Taking Back Philosophy provide arguments aimed at the sense of anti-
intellectualism that pervades “American” culture and claims about the uselessness of philosophy. 
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Liberation philosophers put it the following way, even if it is considered “the pursuit of truth” or 
“love of wisdom”: philosophical praxis should never be reduced to the pursuit of truth or love wisdom 
for its own sake.19 In order for philosophy to be a praxis that contributes to society, one has to take it 
out of the over-specialized manifestations that have formed inside of academia. I am not saying that 
specialization in philosophy is irrelevant. However, it needs to be contextualized, as Van Norden 
explains using Bertrand Russell’s work.20 
Such an approach to a very nuanced understanding of philosophy restores a sense of sociality to 
philosophy. I mean “sociality” in the sense of bringing into conversation the philosophical points of 
view of different cultures, thus the expansion of philosophical thought and not just the demand that 
“others think like me.” But also “sociality” in the sense making sure philosophers can explain to 
themselves and society at large the importance of their work. That being said, there is an unspoken 
tension in the book that arises in light of Van Norden’s emphasis on helping philosophy combat the 
anti-intellectualism of the current day, not to mention his desire to restore philosophy to the sense of 
vocation held by Socrates, Confucius, or the Nahuatl-speaking tlamatinimi, Quetzalcoatl. How can 
we afford to the do the former when immersed in a fight about the importance of critical thinking, 
that is, when the very idea of philosophy is called into question? Manipulating the call for philosophy 
to be more practical, many philosophers will find this to be a reason why diversification needs to be 
put off. You can only do so much, or so the claim will go. Yet, as I hope to have explained above, 
practical relevance in philosophy, if such a goal is desired, is achieved by meeting students where 
they are, by broadening philosophical horizons in ways that take philosophers “outside” of 
themselves. On top of that, if the goal is to factor in more minorities and women into the field, or 
indeed philosophers from outside the English-speaking world, then demonstrating what philosophy 
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